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Introduction
From his very first sentence, Colin Leys seems to
misunderstand or misinterpret the basic purpose
and contribution of the IBRD/IDS study
Redistribution with Growth. It is not, as he
claims, to provide analytical tools to explain why
the poverty of the poor in the Third World
remains in spite of growth over the last 10 or 15
years, and to indicate new kinds of policies which
could reduce their poverty in the future. Rather
it is to explore the issues and to provide analytical
tools for quantifying what has happened, which
may help to quantify the issues añd trade-offs
involved in planning for a reduction in poverty
in the future. This may seem a small difference in
interpretationbut in fact it is crucial. The
starting point, the main focus and the main points
of any originality as an intellectual contribution
in RwG are all closely linked to issues of quanti-
fication and econometric modelling. It is in no
sense a general analysis of the issues of poverty
and maldistribution of income, let alone a
comprehensive discussion of what policies might
help to deal with them.
The original idea of the study, as explained in the
first paragraph of the preface was the "notable
inconsistency between the general perception of
income distribution and employment as major
problems for developing countries on the one
hand and the analytical tools available to policy-
makers on the other". More specifically, for some
of us in the Institute, our point of departure arose
directly from experience with the ILO Employ-
ment Missions to Colombia, Sri Lanka and
Kenya.
In each of these, we had attempted to develop an
appropriate quantitative framework for modelling
the elements of new policy which these reports
proposed, but we had been frustrated in every
case by our inability, given the shortage of time
and lack of basic research, to go much beyond a
conventional and most inadequate framework of
national acountancy. The IBRD/IDS study was
an attempt to remedy this deficiency.
The discussion in RwG is naturally not entirely
confined to technical issues of quantification and
modellingand in a number of chapters the
volume explores in more general terms what is
involved in the adoption of strategies directed
towards the eradication of poverty. This is a
necessary part of the study, both to provide the
context in which issues of quantification can be
explored, and in a more general way, to argue the
need for the conscious and widespread adoption
of poverty-focused strategies if the position of the
poor is to be substantively advanced in the next
decade. But even in tackling these matters, the
treatment is deliberately limited and primarily
directed towards those concerned with technical
issues of economic planning.
It is these sections of the study which Colin Leys
particularly attacksessentially because he argues
that the book suggests that poverty may be
alleviated in a considerable range of Third World
countries without radically changing the capitalist
character of their social formation. In this respect
Colin Leys argues that the approach of the volume
constitutes a definite political programme, at once
inconclusive because it has no theory of political
change to explain why its approach will prove
acceptable to the present elites, and reactionary,
because its basic political assumptions are, he
argues, directed against revolutionary change and
in favour of the preservation of private capital
and hence, by implication its political power"a
standpoint which must be judged" (as Colin added
for good measure in an earlier note) "in the
context of the book's origins within the World
Bank".
The first of these pointsthat poverty may be
alleviated in a considerable range of Third World
countries without radically changing the capitalist
character of their social formationsis, as
concerns the past, a factual point on which
evidence can presumably be collected, evaluated
and argued over. As regards future prospects, it
is a matter for analysis and theory, but pre-
sumably not unrelated to past experience.
As regards the second pointthat RwG lacks an
adequate theorythere presumably need be no
argument, since the volume itself admits in the
introduction that "we are far from a theory of
income distribution". The issue is not whether
RwG has an adequate theory of income distribu-
tion and social change, but whether anyone has.
The third point was that RwG is either deliber-
ately or unconsciously directed against revolu-
tionary change and in favour of the preservation
and the power of private capital. This is a gross
* I am grateful for helpful comments from Dudley Seers,
Emanuel de Kadt and Michael Millsand from members
of the first M.Phil course in development studies.
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misinterpretation or misrepresentation of what is
the books' essential assumption, namely the recog-
nition that a 'fundamental redirection of strategy'
is needed. lt is true that by analyzing what might
be done in countries with mixed economic and
political systems, the report implies that some-
thing can be done in such countries and that it is
worth trying. But this is a far cry from arguing
that more radical strategies have no place, let
alone deliberately devising strategies directed in
favour of the preservation of private capital. It is
all the more misleading to direct such attacks
against a volume which in numerous places
unambiguously identifies the place of nationaliza-
tion and land reform, and which includes case
studies of Cuba, Tanzania and Sri Lanka in its
annex. In fact, as will be argued, it is not RwG
which rules out radical change, but the position
of Colin Leys, which excludes taking seriously the
problem of what can be done when more radical
change seems extremely unlikely. These three
issues form the basis of this rejoinder, taken up
in sections 2, 3 and 4.
Because Colin Leys's critique of the politics of
RwG gives a limited and partial view, a brief
presentation of the basic argument of RwG is
also included in section 2 in order to identify the
real points of difference and to relate the con-
troversy to the original argument. Necessarily the
reply to the sharp criticism in Colin Leys's article
may seem tough and uncompromisingbecause
a polarizing attack tends to evoke a polarizing
rebuttal. But I do not believe that on many of the
issues the differences in position are as clear-cut
as Colin Leys would argue. Nor do 1 wish to
suggest that I or any other authors of RwG are
fully satisfied with the IBRD/IDS document as
it stands. And in section 4 of this reply I indicate
my own view of the weaknesses in our analysis
of RwG and of fruitful directions for future work
and refinement.
Redistribution with Growthevidence and sfrategy
The IBRD/IDS study starts with a quantitative
review of income distribution within some 66
developed and less developed countries and of
changes in distribution over the last decade,
based on the admittedly very inadequate statistics
available.
The broad conclusions of the review are worth
quoting:
that the highest degree of overall equality in
the distribution of pre-tax income appears in
the socialist countries, in which the lowest
40 per cent of households may receive about
25 per cent of total household income;
that developed countries are evenly distri-
buted between those of low and those of
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moderate inequality. The average income
share of the lowest 40 per cent of households
in all of them taken together is about 16 per
cent;
that most of the under-developed countries
show markedly greater relative inequality
than the developed countrieswith about
half falling in the range of high inequality
and a third in the range of moderate in-
equality. According to the statistics available
the income shares for the lowest 40 per cent
of households average 12+ per cent, with
half the countries averaging only 9 per cent.
Even a cursory inspection of the statistical
evidence, weak though it is, reveals a pattern
complex and diverse. The analysis of changes in
income distribution over the l.ast decade confirms
the already well publicized conclusion that growth
without redistribution was the widespread
experience of the 1960s, one which has increas-
ingly attracted the critical attention of both
analysts and policy makers of a wide spectrum of
political persuasions. But the IBRD/IDS study
shows th.at this pattern was neither uniform nor
universal. There were cases, both socialist and
capitalist, of rapid growth with redistribution, of
little growth and no redistribution, and of
redistribution with no growth.
This diversity of experience leads to two
important conclusions relevant to the rest of the
study: that a high rate of economic growth
appears to have no adverse effect on relative
equality, and that increases in the concentration
of income are not inevitable, even in capitalist
countries advancing from low levels of per capita
income. These are important points, particularly
because it is often argued that income must
become more unequally distributed as poor
countries get richer, as a result of output coming
increasingly from the initially small industrial
sectors, with their higher capital intensities and
higher rates of productivity growth. A number of
earlier studies had indeed suggested that it was
inevitable that this pattern would occur, once
countries moved to per capita incomes above$200a pattern often reinforced by unequal
access to land, credit, education and formal sector
employment, and urban or class bias in the
distribution of public expenditure as well as in
government fiscal and trade policies. In contrast,
the IBRD/IDS volume shows that this pattern,
though often observed, is by no means inevitable.
In a number of low-income countries income
distribution has not worsened; in some it has
improved.
This lack of any inevitable tendency towards
worsening income distribution may not seem
surprising to those who emphasize the predomin-
ance of 'politics' over 'economics' in matters of
distribution. But as in other matters the empirical
evidence suggests that it would be equally mis-
leading to generalize too dogmatically about the
type of political system which has led to improve-
ments in income distribution. Although the
socialist countries show the highest degree of
overall equality, improvements in income distri-
bution are by no means limited to countries
following socialist strategies.
"While generalizations as to the relative effective-
ness of different policies are not yet possible, the
bulk of the developing countries in which the poor
have shared equitably in income growthIsrael,
Yugoslavia, T.aiwan, Korea, Sri Lanka, Costa
Rica, Tanzaniaconsists of countries that have
taken positive action to this end" (pXV).
A second basic theme of the IBRD/IDS study
is that a trade-off between growth and redistribu-
tion is not inevitable. Strategies to achieve RwG
can be economically efficient. At first sight, this
may not seem surprising, but again note (j) a
trade-off between growth and distribution has
been typical of most of the quantitative models
which have been developed to analyse economic
growth; (ii) for most neo-classical economists, the
general existence of a trade-off between growth
and redistribution has long been a point of
orthodoxy; (iii) for many socialist theorists also,
growth was the first goal and redistribution only
a goal to be admitted after the first had been
secured. Stalin himself in 1931 spoke against the
dangers of 'petty bourgeois egalitarianism' and
argued the need for growth first and redistribution
later.
The main thrust of the IBRD/IDS study is
directed towards strategies for combining redistri-
bution with growth. The analysis (as I have
noted) is not in the form of a general treatment
of what such strategies would involve economic-
ally or politically, let alone an elaboration of the
details of policy in every sector. Instead the
volume attempts to identify the main elements
which must be incorporated in quantitative
models and explorations. In essence, the IBDS/
IDS exposition of RwG develops the following
points:
1. Strategies which combine redistribution with
growth are essential if poverty in Third World
countries of low per capita income is to be
rapidly eliminated. Neither growth nor redistri-
bution alone will be sufficient.
2. Four dimensions of policy are involved, usually
in combination, in RwG strategies:
(a) accelerating GNP growth through raising
savings and allocating resources more
efficiently with benefits to all groups in
society;
redistribution of existing assets;
asset redistribution by redirecting new
investment into the creation of assets
generating income for the poorest;
transfer of income in support of consump-
tion of the poorest.
Strong but not exclusive emphasis is given to
redírecting public investment to raise the pro-
ductive capacity and incomes of the poor. But
the volume recognizes that to be effective RwG
will involve to some degree each of the four
elements of policy.
3. The political context is usually the most
important determinant of whether RwG strategies
will be effective. The volume recognizes that a
radical commitment to income redistribution may
lead to more rapid change, but it identifies three
major reasons why even regimes without a funda-
mental commitment to income redistribution and
the alleviation of poverty may nevertheless be led
to adopt RwG policies: enlightened self-interest,
based on short or long-run, real or imagined,
gains from improvements in the position of the
poorest; conflicts of interest within the elite group
which can be exploited to the advantage of the
poor and to achieve greater power for them in the
longer run; conflicts and differences of interests
between domestic elites and international interests.
Since Colin Leys is so critical of the lack of
political realism of RwG it is perhaps worth
quoting two paragraphs on these points:
"The first possibility is that the eliteor some
sections of itwill make concessions to the poor
out of enlightened self-interest. It may fear,
rightly or wrongly, that the revolutionary
potential of the poor will be realized unless the
burden of their poverty is eased. The rich who
subscribe to this view may be prepared to give up
something so as not to lose all in a total revolu-
tion. More positively, certain kinds of investments
in the poor, such as education and health, may
lead to long-term pay-offs to the rich who need
productive workers to operate their capital. Even
if elite opinion is not unanimous on these matters,
the fact of disagreement holds out some prospects
for reformers of all kinds.
The second possibility is that the different consti-
tuent groups of the elite will have conflicts serious
enough for them to seek a measure of support
from among other groups of the polity, thereby
increasing the effective representation of the latter
groups (be they feudal landlords or rich peasants)
will eventually fall out over the setting of the
prices of agricultural products relative to those of
industrial goods. As all urban groups have an
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interest in cheap food, urban capitalists may
attempt to enlist the support of organized workers
in order to break the power of the landed interests
now opposed to them. With the same end in view,
they made also side with peasants' demands for
a distributist land reform if the resulting small-
holdersystem promises a better economic and
political accommodation. Such potential cleavages
among ruling groups provide reformers and
others representing sections of the poor with
opportunities to exploit, which if seized, may
provide further openings through an improvement
in the 'representativeness' of the political system".
4. The adoption of a strategy of RwG requires
reformulation of policy and action on many
levels:
(j) the conscious adoption of objectives relat-
ing to redistribution as well as to growth;
the development and refinement of quan-
titative planning models to include these
dimensions of policy and to project other
quantitative effects over time, parallel to
the GNP frameworks developed in both
socialist and mixed economies;
to make these strategies effective on a local
level, integrated programmes focused on
the particular needs of the main groups in
poverty, based on statistical profiles, defin-
ing the geographical, occupational, educa-
tional, and other socio-economic charac-
teristics of the groups with low incomes.
5. The use of a wide range of policy instruments
in six main areas of policy intervention: factor
markets, employment and income, ownership and
control of assets, education and human capital,
taxation of personal income and wealth, the
provision of public consumption goods, com-
modity markets and technology.
6. New measures of economic growth are needed
to monitor this process, nationally and inter-
nationally. Conventional measures of rates of
economic growth (e.g. rates of growth of GNP),
far from being neutral and unbiased, in fact give
disproportionate weight to income growth among
the richest members of the community. Alternative
weighting systems are proposed to monitor and
evaluate macro performance, including two
examples: a 'neutral, one man one vote' weighting
system which gives equal weight to each person,
and 'poverty weights' which give greater weight
to income growth among the poorer groups.
The IBRD/IDS volume elaborates these issues in
a number of respects, focusing particularly on the
quantitative and economic issues in the context of
strategy-making and model-building. Sections in
Part I deal with the economic and political
framework required for re-orientating policy,
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followed by Iwo chapters considering the scope
for policy intervention and the central elements
in formulating a strategy, later illustrated in terms
of rural, urban, and international policy. Part II
of the volume deals more specifically with issues
of quantification methodology for improving
planning models, contrasting available planning
models at the national, sectoral and regional level
with explorations into the elements of a model
which could combine distribution and growth. It
closes with sections on statistical and research
priorities required for a more integrated approach
to growth and income distribution. An annex to
the volume includes six brief case studies, out-
lining performance with respect to growth and
distribution over the last two decades in India,
Cuba, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, South Korea and
Taiwan.
The problems of theory
Colin Leys attacks RwG for lacking an adequate
theory of income distribution. Who doesn't?
Those wishing to criticize the developments 1n
RwG should consider seriously the alternatives.
At the theoretical level, there are no reliable and
refined models seriously focused on income
distribution by household or individual income
group. The main Marxist and Ricardian models
are primarily focused on factor shares, not size
distribution of income, and for that matter have
only rarely been quantified. The neo-classical
model which has been carried via human capital
analysis into elaborate work on wage and salary
structures, has been subject to such criticisms as
to forfeit the title adequate. Operational planning
models, elaborations of Harrod-Domar or input-
output models whether developed in eastern or
western countries, usually fail to deal with income
distribution by income size groups. The truth is
that we all lack an adequate theory of income
distribution, even Colin.
The development of such a theory will not be
easy. Existing data on income distribution in
different countries reveal a pattern which defies
the simple theories of both quantitative and non-
quantitative analysts. However countries are
grouped, whatever characteristics are identified
from the major theories of income distribution to
predict tendencies, whatever allowances are made
for the unreliability of the data, the actual
statistics reveal a pattern of growth and income
distribution, cross sectional and over time, which
defies explanation at present. As already men-
tioned, it is not true that income distribution has
worsened in all countries, or in all low-income
capitalist countries. It is not true that income
distribution has always improved. There are no
strong correlations between growth and move-
ments towards or away from greater income
equality.' Some of the more imaginative work,
such as that of Adelman and Morris, reveals
certain patterns and provides some hope for
further scientific analysis.2
But anyone of a scientific turn of mind must
broadly admit that we are at the beginning of a
long journey of intellectual and social exploration
for which the theoretical maps so far available
are grotesquely unreliableand I would add that
the main contours of these maps will only be
outlined by looking forward rather than looking
back. At present the unreliability of the basic data
permits simple and dogmatic interpretations to
flourish. But as new and better data become
available, the challenge to theory will be greater.
My own position, outlined in chapter 8 of RwG,
is that the inadequacies and uncertainties of the
main available models or paradigms mean that
those seriously interested in contributing to
policy-making should be willing to check their
conclusions for policy against different paradigms,
and attempt as best they can to see how sensitive
their policy conclusions are to the different frame-
works adopted. The technique of 'sensitivity
analysis' at lower levels of analysis is well
established as a guide to .decision-making in
situations of uncertainty. Sensitivity analysis can
be applied also at a higher level. And why not?
This does not mean that everyone must remain
open-minded on every issue. But those concerned
to relate to the problems of improving decision-
making in capitalist or socialist countries need
to think twice before they dogmatically operate
only within a single paradigm.
Redistribution with Growthrefonnist or radical?
Colin Leys argues that RwG is necessarily a
non-radical incrementalist strategy. If by this he
means that RwG is in part concerned with
evolutionary strategies I would agree. But if he
implies that RwG as a strategy, let alone as a
quantitative framework for modelling, cannot
take account of more radical transformations of
society, then this is a complete misinterpretation.
The four elements of RwG summarised in
chapter 2 of the book include, at a highly aggre-
gated level, elements of strategy which, like asset
distribution, have been conventionally central to
radical programmes. In fact, the four elements of
Since the publication of RwG, Hollis Chenery has published
a further volume analysing the statistical pattern of develop-
ment observed in some 101 countries from 1950 to 1970.
This reveals very low regression coefficients (both absolutely
and relatively) for the basic regressions relating to income
distribution. See Hollis Chenery and Moises Syrquin,
Patterns of Development 1950-1970. OUP, 1975.
2 Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Economic Growth
and Social Equity in Developing Countries, Stanford,
1973.
RwG can be found in some degree in both
reformist and radical, capitalist and socialist
tr.ansformations. At this level of aggregation and
economic abstraction the differences in strategy
are not in content, but in the extent to which the
different elements of RwG are stressed. Growth,
for example, is an important policy objective in
most countries, whether capitalist or socialist
(though it is probably less clear today than a
decade ago whether on average the socialist
regimes achieve a better growth performance
than comparable capitalist economies). Income
transfers to consumption are widely accepted
instruments of policy, although in practice
probably less important in both types of economy
than rhetoric often suggests.
lt is in respect of asset distribution and asset
creation that the big difference emerges, with
socialist regimes being commited to more radical
changes in the structure of ownership of capital
and organization of production than capitalist
regimes. Neverthelessand this is the essential
point for those concerned to quantify and to
model the processit is untrue to suggest that the
difference in ownership of assets (or access to
them by the poor) is always a matter of sharp
dichotomy, with no differences of degree. Socialist
countries vary quite considerably in the extent
to which assets are privately owned, particularly
land and other assets required for agricultural
production. Moreover, even those like China and
Cuba which have moved to the socialization of
most privately-owned capital3 did so in strategic
stagesin a process which could be quantitatively
analyzed as a radical application of redistribution
with growth. Similarly, capitalist economies are
usually far from being text book models, and
already the state owns many of the means of
production.
This is not to argue that statistical quantification
of the extent of asset ownership or redistribution
adequately captures the essence of the process of
socialist transformation. Obviously it does not.
But those who think that either quantification is
unnecessary or that existing planning models and
approaches (whether of capitalist or socialist
economies) are adequate are making a great
mistake. A major reason why people make this
mistake is that they have never seriously faced
the question of what needs to be done to improve
planning for decision-making for long-run change.
It is not enough to quote Nkrumah's dictum
(itself somewhat plagiarized) "seek ye first the
political kingdom and all else will be added unto
3 Treating human capital as a form of asset, as in the
IBRD/IDS volume, shows that even in the most socialized
countries by no means all assets are publicly owned.
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you". The priority of politics is not disputed in
RwG. But the question remains, having put
political issues first, what can be done to improve
quantitative understanding of the issues for
choice?
The contribution which quantitative macro-
economics can make to the improvement of
practical decision-making and implementation is
inevitably a matter of some debate and con-
troversy. The importance of this one aspect in the
whole complex of decision-making and action is
easily overstated. But at the same time, there is
no reason for going to the other extremeof
arguing so hard that the real issues are political
and strategic that one ignores the need for their
quantitative and scientific investigation and the
practical need to develop quantitative tools which
can be operational.
The proposals in RwG for disaggregating the
objective functions of planning models, in order
to weight differently the increments of income
accruing to different income groups, are a modest
advance, which it is surprising to see Colin Leys
reject so summarily. Does he really imagine that
economic performance and future economic
objectives can be adequately assessed, analysed,
or planned without reference to some quantitative
indicators of income growth? 1f not what does he
propose in place of what is proposed in chapter 2?
At this point, there is real danger that the line to
which Colin Leys's argument leads would take us
straight back to the pre-scientific 17th century.
The need for quantitative measures, properly
disaggregated and relevantly focused, must be
broadly common to all of us in the social and
physical sciences. The weaknesses of excessively
aggregated and often unreliable GNP measures
are now widely recognised. Why then attack so
virulently an attempt to explore the relevance of
disaggregated measures of income growth and
distribution?4
This emphasis on the quantitative aspects of
RwG is, as explained at the beginning, central to
the IBRD/JDS study's origins and objectives and
for this reason I have set out the argument for
the neutrality of RwG as a quantitative model in
some detail. But Colin Leys is not really con-
cerned with quantitative models.5 The essence of
4 The lack of both data and relevant planning models has
been a serious deficiency in Cuba, for examplewitness the
inadequacy of planning models imported from Czechoslovakiain the years just after the revolution. See for instance E.
Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba, Monthly
Review Press, New York, 1968.
5 The need for quantitative modelling and exploration of long-
run alternatives has long remained a blind spot in his
perception of what is required to improve planning and
decision-makingcuriously for someone who has stressed the
value of performance budgeting itt administration. See "The
Analysis of Planning" in Colin Leys (cd) Politics and
Change in Developing Countries, Cambridge, 1969,
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his attack is that RwG, although (perhaps
because) it does not claim to be, is in fact "a
highly political document", reformist and anti-
socialist, if not positively reactionary. RwG, Colin
Leys states, assumes "that the Third World
countries in question will continue to be pre-
dominantly capitalist societies" in which the
distribution of income and political power "will
continue to be based primarily on the private
ownership of capital" and that "social revolution
ought to be avoided".
Colin Leys suggests something deeply underhand
in thispolitically reactionary without ever
declaring itself as such. But this is not justified,
even accepting Colin Leys's summary as it stands.
The first of the assumptions which Colin st.ates
underlie the RwG volume is a matter of judgment:
any perceptive analyst, Marxist or non-Marxist,
writing at any time during the last 100 years,
might well have assumed it, though as it happens
it is overstated, as a summary of what RwG
assumes both about the economic and political
systems in many Third World countries and about
the determinants of income distribution.
These points are importantbut not crucial for
Colin Leys's attack. It is his other presumption
that RwG assumes that "social revolution ought
to be avoided" which is critical. But is this in any
way a fair statement of what RwG really
assumes?
It is true that RwG broadly concentrates on
reformist rather than revolutionary strategies-
though there are numerous references to the need
for effective land reform, nationalization, the
creation of state-owned enterprises producing
mass consumption goods, the need for the
mobilization of the poor and for new institutions
catering for their needs. But the reason for the
volume's concentration on reformist strategies is
straightforward. "Since our main concern is with
the more typical countries of the Third World, we
have not attempted to assess the experience of
either the socialist countries or the earlier policies
of the now advanced Western countries, although
there is much to be learned from both" (p. xvii).
The unfairness of Colin Ley's critique here is
shown by the innuendo which he often conveys
by his selection of quotations from the volume.
For example, he suggests that when the volume
argues for land redistribution it does so bec.ause
it attaches a high value to preserving the existing
fabric of society. The basis for this is a statement
quoted from chapter 3 that once the peasantry's
immediate demands for land are met it will
become a conservative force and a bulwark of
the new status quo. Colin Leys does not acknowl-
edge (as the IBRD/IDS volume does) that the
volume includes a footnote stating that this was
Lenin's conclusion after analysing Stolypin's
agrarian policy. It seems unfair to Lenin and for
that matter to the authors of the IBRD/IDS
volume to suggest that to note an historical
consequence is to recommend it.
Or again, Colin attacks the target group approach
because it is "far removed from any conception
of change in which the activities and the con-
sciousness of the poor themselves are really
expected to play a leading part". This seems to me
at variance to what the IBRD/IDS volume states
on page 65. "The mass organized support of the
poor constitutes a political resource which can be
put to use in carrying through programmes to
their advantage. Indeed a strategy which seeks to
remove poverty may prove empty or impossible
to implement unless the poor develop sufficient
consciousness and organization to provide support
from below to maintain the momentum of the
poverty alleviation programme over a period of
many years". In practice, I am not sure whether,
in the analyses of many of these points in a
specific context, the difference between Colin
Leys and the IBRD/IDS authors is really as
sharp as he suggests. The real difference is not in
the analysis of the forces at work but in the
implications for action. Here Colin Leys takes
RwG to task not only for neglecting revolutionary
strategies but even, it seems, for. exploring what
might be done in non-revolutionary situations.
He attacks attempts to consider evolutionary,
reformist strategies without ever declaring what
he would propose instead. Indeed, he seems to
dismiss this whole issue and its most practical
consequences on the grounds that it is reactionary
even to assume that there can be situations in
which radical change is politically unlikely. He
gives two reasons for this: (j) that no statistical
meaning can be attached to these apparent state-
ments of probability; (ii) that RwG is "a docu-
ment concerned with policy and prepared within
and published by the World Rank" and, given
this, the judgment that radical social changes are
unlikely assumes the character of a programme
rather than a prognosis.
Granted that there is no question of statistical
precision in making such estimates, is Colin Leys
suggesting that people do not or should not
attempt to form a view of such probabilities as a
basis for action? Such a purist approach would
rule out most persons and parties, of a wide
variety of political persuasions, concerned with
political change.
One cannot help feeling that the argument which
provided clinching proof to Colin Leys of the
need to dismiss RwG as reactionary was its
association with the World Bank. Or, as some
would say, "if the World Bank has anything to
do with it, it must be reactionary".
This argument is both misleading and dangerous.
lt is factually misleading because the Bank's
participation, as explained in the preface, does
not imply endorsement. But more significant, it is
misleading because it assumes that the Bank is a
monolithwith staff recruited, organized or
controlled to a degree which ignores the realities
of a diverse and complex organization. So much
is this so, with respect to RwG and poverty-
focused planning, that I personally would see the
problem as almost totally the opposite to that
which Colin Leys identifies: namely, that far from
RwG being general Bank policy, it will be treated
too often, though hopefully not always and not
in the longer run, as merely an academic product
of the research department.
This leads me to the dangerous part of Colin
Leys's argumentthe implication that the position
of international institutions such as the Bank are
predictable, unchangeable and inevitably re-
actionary. Just at the stage when China is joining
many of the international institutions, when
several socialist countries have joined the World
Bank, when the pattern of staff recruitment has
been changing rapidly, when changes in voting
are finally under serious discussion, and when
those pressing for change need support and con-
structive analysis about what the next steps should
be, such an attitude is dangerous because the
belief that nothing can be changed rapidly leads
to the belief that nothing is to be done.
For although at the national level, some may
pick and choose countries worthy of their concern,
at the international level there really is no alterna-
tive to grappling with the hard realities of the
current world situation and asking how one can
move from the present chaos and injustice to
something better. These are practical questions
which involve hard thought and probably com-
promisebut one cannot wish them away and
simply choose another system.
In contrast, I would argue that those really
concerned with improvements in income distri-
bution and the situation of those in poverty, need
in each situation seriously to analyse, nationally
and internationally:
I. What change is possible, how fundamental, in
what ways, how rapidly, at what cost and to
whom?
Of the various changes possible, what are the
prospects that each will succeed? What risk of
backlash, external or internal?
If reformist policies are adopted, will they make
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it easier or harder for more radical change to
occur later?
4. If more radical political ch.ange seems possible,
how likely is it that income distribution and the
position of the poorest will be significantly
improved? Social revolution can open the way to
fundamental transformation. But not all radical
change leads to social revolution. Not all political
instability benefits the poor and too often it is
the poor who bear the cost.
It is only too easy to rally behind ideological
banners at this pointand to avoid these difficult
questions. Honest men may differ on the answers
in any actual situation, and there is always a
tendency for the more optimistic reformers and
for the more doctrinaire revolutionaries to pre-
judge the issues, coming down with a predictable
consistency on one side or another. But are the
issues so open and closed? Those genuinely
committed to social advance ought to be willing
to explore the conditions for achieving change by
whatever routes may be open.
Colin Leys seems to rule out any significant
change by the reformist route, in general and in
particular, without ever seriously exploring what
has been achieved in the long run and the short,
by reform and by revolutionary change. It is not
sufficient to argue that in the long run funda-
mental change will certainly come. Can one
seriously ignore what might be achieved in the
next 10 years?
Take Kenya, a particular country in which some
of us when asked what to do, attempted to work
out what RwG would mean in terms of specific
changes of policy covering most sectors of the
economy.
Colin Leys devotes a good part of a reoent
brilliant and stimulating book6 to a detailed
analysis of why such recommendations are
absurd. He admits, in fact, that the analysis of the
problem in the ¡LO report and the much fuller
analysis in his book do not differ so much, but
he goes on: "The obvious puzzle presented by
these proposals is what incentive the mission
thought all these groupsthe heart and soul of
domestic and foreign capitalmight possibly
have for making such sacrifices?" But what does
Colin Leys propose instead? The final paragraph
of his book is worth quoting: "Academic studies
can contribute little to achieve new strategies of
development grounded in the interests of the mass
of those who are currently the victims of under-
development. Perhaps the most that such studies
can do is to try not to obscure the structures of
6 Colin Leys Underdevelopment in Kenya: the political economy
of neo-colonialism, Heinemann, London 1975. (This will be
reviewed in the next issue of the Bulletined.)
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exploitation and oppression which under-develop-
ment produces and which in turn sustain it"
(p. 275).
It is to me highly significant that Colin Leys
never clearly states what he proposes instead. He
writes from the position of a fascinated observer,
free from any risk of being corrupted by involve-
ment in action and policy. The temptation for the
academic to withdraw to an ivory tower of this
sort is strong, and there are many ways of justify-
ing this positionthe need for 'academic detach-
ment', for analytical clarity, for time to do serious
work. There is obviously some case in all such
arguments. But note their inherent elitism. Few
except the academics and the wealthy can afford
to withdraw. Only the expatriate is pri'ileged to
pick and choose his country and to dismiss the
others if they reveal no chance of radical reform.
In contrast to this detachment, most of mankind
has to reside, work and often suffer in their own
country, without the chance to shift their work or
even their interests to the more hopeful or more
interesting situations. Is there nothing worth
doing in these situations?
Some further criticisms
I do not wish to end with the implication that the
IBRD/IDS volume is adequate as it standsthat
there is nothing to criticise in its treatment and
no omissions which urgently require action. There
are many confusions and gaps, even in terms of
its objectives and focus. I would particularly
identify the following gaps:
Historical an.alysis and perspective.
Concern with non-material goals and institu-
tional structures in development models, including
patterns of employment, rural and urban.
A more disaggregated approachparticularly
the need to disaggregate the treatment of assets-
analysing separately land from other physical
capital, and physical from human capital. Each
has different characteristics and quite different
potential in a strategy of RwG.
Integration of a wider range of models dealing
explicitly with different aspects of capitalist and
socialist strategies.
Identification of the crucial changes which
enable RwG to take place and be sustained over
time in (j) capitalist and (ii) socialist structures, in
the face of (j) crude capitalist interests and/or
inefficiency or (ii) crude party-bureaucratic
interests and/or inefficiency.
These are admittedly a formidable list of
omissionsa long but necessary agenda for
further work.
'What is not helpful is to suggest that the socialist
or capitalist world has a monopoly on planning
techniques or relevant policies for tackling these
issues. Those concerned to rid the world of
poverty and exploitation, whatever their current
political commitments, will do well not to close
their eyes to the complexity of the problems, the
range of relevant experience and the need for both
improvements in planning techniques and wide-
spread participation in achieving these basic goals.
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